The European union as a counter-terrorism actor: right path, wrong direction? by Wade, Marianne
 
 
University of Birmingham
The European union as a counter-terrorism actor:
right path, wrong direction?
Wade, Marianne
DOI:
10.1007/s10611-013-9472-8
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Wade, M 2013, 'The European union as a counter-terrorism actor: right path, wrong direction?', Crime, Law and
Social Change, vol. 62, no. 3, pp. 355-383. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-013-9472-8
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
A definitive version was subsequently published in the above cited journal at the above DOI address. The final publication is available at
link.springer.com.
Eligibility checked for repository: December 2014
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
After online publication, subscribers (personal/institutional) to this journal will have
access to the complete article via the DOI using the URL:
If you would like to know when your article has been published online, take advantage
of our free alert service. For registration and further information, go to:
http://www.springerlink.com.
Due to the electronic nature of the procedure, the manuscript and the original figures
will only be returned to you on special request. When you return your corrections,
please inform us, if you would like to have these documents returned.
Dear Author
Here are the proofs of your article.
• You can submit your corrections online, via e-mail or by fax.
• For online submission please insert your corrections in the online correction form.
Always indicate the line number to which the correction refers.
• You can also insert your corrections in the proof PDF and email the annotated PDF.
• For fax submission, please ensure that your corrections are clearly legible. Use a fine
black pen and write the correction in the margin, not too close to the edge of the page.
• Remember to note the journal title, article number, and your name when sending your
response via e-mail or fax.
• Check the metadata sheet to make sure that the header information, especially author
names and the corresponding affiliations are correctly shown.
• Check the questions that may have arisen during copy editing and insert your
answers/corrections.
• Check that the text is complete and that all figures, tables and their legends are included.
Also check the accuracy of special characters, equations, and electronic supplementary
material if applicable. If necessary refer to the Edited manuscript.
• The publication of inaccurate data such as dosages and units can have serious
consequences. Please take particular care that all such details are correct.
• Please do not make changes that involve only matters of style. We have generally
introduced forms that follow the journal’s style.
• Substantial changes in content, e.g., new results, corrected values, title and authorship are
not allowed without the approval of the responsible editor. In such a case, please contact
the Editorial Office and return his/her consent together with the proof.
• If we do not receive your corrections within 48 hours, we will send you a reminder.
• Your article will be published Online First approximately one week after receipt of your
corrected proofs. This is the official first publication citable with the DOI. Further
changes are, therefore, not possible.
• The printed version will follow in a forthcoming issue.
Please note
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10611-013-9472-8
AUTHOR'S PROOF
Metadata of the article that will be visualized in OnlineFirst
 
1 Article Title The European union as a counter–terrorism actor: right path,
wrong direction?
2 Article Sub- Title
3 Article Copyright -
Year
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
(This will be the copyright line in the final PDF)
4 Journal Name Crime, Law and Social Change
5
Corresponding
Author
Family Name Wade
6 Particle
7 Given Name Marianne
8 Suffix
9 Organization University of Birmingham
10 Division Birmingham Law School
11 Address West Midlands, UK
12 e-mail mlwade@bham.ac.uk
13
Schedule
Received  
14 Revised  
15 Accepted  
16 Abstract
17 Keywords
separated by ' - '
18 Foot note
information
   
   
AUTHOR'S PROOF
U
N
C
O
R
R
EC
TE
D
PR
O
O
F
1
2
3
4The European union as a counter–terrorism actor: right
5path, wrong direction?
6M Q1arianne Wade
7
8# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
9
10Introduction
11The challenges presented by terrorism to our governments in the past decade have led
12to fundamental changes in many things. The way we travel and the way we bank
13have, for instance, changed perceivably. Some avoid travelling to the USA—the
14country formerly known as “the leader of the free world”—out of a desire to avoid
15the need for a passport featuring biometric information or “being treated as a
16criminal” surrendering fingerprints at the point of entry. The more data protection
17aware amongst us may have changed the way we use the internet and other forms of
18communication technology or simply accepted the feeling that we can be watched at
19all times. Less obviously, a new security architecture has emerged around us and for
20Europeans, the EU looms large within it.1
21Not all changes in this setting can be ascribed to terrorism; the post-Lisbon EU2 is
22undoubtedly a creature very different to anything envisaged by the founding fathers
23of its origin European Communities -, nor do all of those perhaps associated with the
24threat of terrorism connect to counter-terrorism in a logical way when examined
25closely. Nevertheless, there is no denying that terrorism and the desire of European
26governments to counter it effectively, have driven changes; spear-headed impulses for
27change which have deeply changed some aspects of our lives and the role the EU
28plays in relation to them. The dynamics of reform have been so pervasive, it is almost
29shocking to reflect upon all that has shifted in the past ten years.
30It is no coincidence that within those 10 years the EU has emerged as a security
31and criminal justice actor of entirely new dimensions. The Treaty of Lisbon which
Crime Law Soc Change
DOI 10.1007/s10611-013-9472-8
1For more general commentary see Wuertenberger et al. [117]
2The Treaty of Lisbon is an international agreement between the EU member states that amends prior
treaties to consolidate EU competence and restructure its bureaucracy post eastward expansion. It has
introduced very significant changes to the EU’s profile as a criminal justice actor providing it, e.g. with a
competence to require the use of criminal law to combat fraud against its financial interests. It also includes
a legal basis for the creation of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO)—See Consolidated Version
of the Treaty on European Union [6] Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [7; arts. 325 and 86]
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32came into force on the 1st of December 2009 leaves us in no doubt of this.
33The facilitating role of the economic supra-national community which lent its
34organs for use by its member states in the inter-governmental third pillar has
35been replaced by a supra-national entity with a clear role as a criminal justice
36actor. Article 83 (1) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union for
37example states:
389T Q2he European Parliament and the Council may, by means of directives adopted
40in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules
41concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of
42particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the
43nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a
44common basis.
45
46These areas of crime are the following: terrorism, trafficking in human beings and
47sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms traf-
48ficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer
49crime and organised crime.
50On the basis of developments in crime, the Council may adopt a decision identi-
51fying other areas of crime that meet the criteria specified in this paragraph. It shall act
52unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
53Terrorism thus heads the list of criminal phenomena for which the post-Lisbon EU
54is ascribed a role in combating. This paper aims to explore the role played by the EU
55in this context thus far and to analyse and evaluate its impact and meaning. It finishes
56with a discussion of the EU’s likely future role in this context as well as the deeper
57meaning of this for the EU and counter-terrorism in Europe.
58The EU as a counter-terrorism actor
59The Council of the EU’s webpage explains the EU counter-terrorism strategy in the
60following terms:
612“The EU’s strategy is comprehensive, covering a wide range of measures.
63These aim at increasing co-operation in fields ranging from intelligence sharing
64to law enforcement and the control of financial assets in order to make it easier
65to find, detain and bring to justice terror suspects. Furthermore, the criminal law
66of the 27 Member States is being aligned so that terrorism is prosecuted and
67punished in the same manner throughout the EU.”3
68
69In pursuit of this strategy, the member states of the EU have used its legislative
70mechanisms and institutional structures (to which they have also added significantly)
71during the past decade to change substantive and procedural law across the Union as
72well as to enhance the institutional competence of criminal justice systems throughout
73Europe. In so doing, they have also transformed the EU into a powerful counter-
74terrorism force.
3 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy?lang=en and Saul [104].
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75Substantive criminal law
76This area of activity is particularly significant not only because it sees the EU taking
77on the role (and in relation thus to the Council of Europe in particular, taking over)
78traditionally played by international organisations.4 Whilst there is no surprise in
79discovering the EU aiming for the harmonisation of laws, ten years ago this was
80revolutionary in relation to criminal justice related matters. Indeed due to the sensi-
81tivity of such action, it was not harmonisation which was strived for in these matters
82but approximation. Nevertheless given that 9 of the 15 EU member states (as they
83were in 2001) featured criminal law systems devoid of any offence of terrorism and
84the nature of EU legislative instruments5 as more effectively binding than commit-
85ments made under international law, their willingness to proceed upon the road taken
86must be viewed as extraordinary.
87Since the Framework Decision of 2002 on Combating Terrorism the EU has been
88the member states’ forum of choice to provide a definition of terrorism and to ensure
89the criminalisation of public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruitment
90and training for terrorism, the provision of instructions (also via the internet) to make
91or use explosives, firearms, noxious or hazardous substances for the purposes of
92committing a terrorist act [16, 31]. In specialist legislation the EU framework has
93been utilised to ensure attacks on information systems are subject to criminal penal-
94ties [24].
95The impact of these EU measures must be regarded as very significant indeed. As
96the EU expanded in 2004 to encompass a further 12 member states (and indeed
97expands by a further one—Croatia—this year), the reach of this understanding of
98terrorism as a distinct offence and the need to accommodate it within criminal codes
99expanded. This perspective became mandatory to any system wishing to adjoin to the
100EU’s economic power. The substantive definitions agreed upon, the predicate of-
101fences required and their definition radically challenged new member states’ criminal
102justice systems forcing fundamental changes or at least radical exceptions. All to deal
103with a problem they did not regard themselves as having but attached great value by
104the EU acquis they were required to accept, adopt and implement.6
105It should further not be overlooked that such measures were not uncontroversial in
106relation to the legal orders of the older member states either. Thus especially the
107creation of a public provocation offence required careful drafting to ensure compli-
108ance with domestic frameworks protecting freedom of expression and of the media
109(see [16; article 2] [93]. Interestingly, however, this area of EU legislation was
110apparently marked by strong compliance and swift implementation by the member
111states [55, 59]. Compared to the slow progress made in relation to other criminal
4 Thus e.g. the United Nations and the Council of Europe have a long tradition of relevant legislation
aiming to achieve an approximation of law by its member states. See e.g. Council of Europe 1977 [8] and
United Nations 1963 [110] as well as further specific Conventions aimed at ensuring universal criminal
liability for acts associated with terrorism all available at: http://www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml.
5 The Framework Decision form used bound member states as to the goal of the legislation even if leaving
them choices as to how to implement. After the Pupino (C-105/03) case the member states were indeed
warned that such legislation had a type of binding effect even failing implementation.
6 See e.g. Korošec and Zgaga [90] and Derenčinović [46] for examples.
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112justice related initiatives—such as the sorry tale of the so called PIF7 Conventions
113and the 2012 reform proposal [63]) aimed at protecting the financial interests of the
114EU itself, this dedication and decisive action by the member states must be
115interpreted as strong support of the EU as a counter-terrorism actor or, at least, as a
116useful tool through which the member states’ can exercise their strong will to operate
117effectively in this context. Viewed retrospectively, whatever the intentions of the
118member states, this activity has effectively transformed the EU in itself into a
119significant counter-terrorism actor; perhaps all the more astonishingly so given the
120deficits which characterise it. (see infra).
121Procedural law
122The developing role of the EU as a criminal justice actor more generally has arguably
123been augmented more strongly in relation to procedural mechanisms introduced.
124Whilst these are available in and by no means used exclusively for counter-
125terrorism cases, it is interesting to recognise in how far their introduction can be
126associated with the counter-terrorism concerns of the member states. It is by no means
127wrong to identify counter-terrorism as the driver of revolutionary developments at the
128EU level. The EU’s status as an actor in the counter-terrorism field can thus be seen as
129a catalyst for its development as a criminal justice actor more broadly.
130Most famously the European Arrest Warrant (hereinafter EAW, [17]) was pushed
131through in the atmosphere of urgency post 9/11. This legislative act provides for
132terrorism—as one of 32 named catalogue offences to which the EAW applies—to no
133longer be subject to a double criminality requirement should a surrender be requested
134of an EU member state by another. Indeed such action is no longer subject to formal
135extradition procedures but to the simplified surrender procedures upon the basis of
136mutual recognition introduced by this measure (for exploration see Keijzer and
137Sliedregt [87]).
138It is hard to overstate the impact of the EAW upon the EU jurisdictions or as a
139driver of EU status. A clear mutation of extradition/mutual legal assistance law, it
140marks the basis of the EU’s distinctive profile in the criminal justice realm. Based
141upon its proclaimed success [61] the principle of mutual recognition has become
142established as the basis of judicial cooperation within the EU [6; art. 82(1)] but
143criticism highlights the need for more comprehensive development of the EU level.
144As such this mutation is indeed the critical step to evolution.
145The history of the EAW tells of an instrument lying in wait and only able to gain
146political consensus and thus momentum in the charged atmosphere of late 2001. Even
147at that point a number of member states apparently agreed only upon condition that
148the EU area of freedom security and justice would also feature a swiftly introduced
149Framework Decision on Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings [54]. Notoriously
150upon this latter legislation we still wait. The further mutual recognition based
151instruments, however, are naturally applicable to counter-terrorism cases. (see e.g.
7 Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protection of
the European Communities' financial interests. OJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 49–57; First Protocol of 27
September 1996 (OJ C 313, 23.10.1996, p. 2) and; Convention of 26 May 1997 (OJ C 195, 25.6.1997)
(corruption); Protocol of 29 November 1996 (OJ C 151, 20.5.1997, p. 2) (court interpretation); Second
Protocol of 19 June 1997 (OJ C 221, 19.7.1997, p. 12) (money laundering).
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152the European Evidence Warrant (EEW) [30] and the European Investigation Order
153(EIO) [68]).
154Perhaps most importantly the EAW has fostered expectation amongst practitioners
155and policy-makers that the EU will be utilised to provide for legislation which
156alleviates the problems they face in cross-border cases. This can possibly be regarded
157as a logical development to accompany the freedom of movement of persons pro-
158vided (for by the EU and indeed particularly the border-free Schengen area [114; p Q3.
15966–67]). Nevertheless, concrete expectations—and indeed demands by NGOs and
160defence-lawyers for action within the EU (see e.g. ECBA [64]; FTI demands8)—have
161certainly gained a far more solid and specific basis as a result of the EAW and
162following measures based upon mutual recognition. As such it is possible to identify
163the counter-terrorism context as massively accelerating the overt advent of the EU as
164an actor in the criminal justice realm. The nature of such procedural measures is not to
165make the EU itself a strong counter-terrorism actor; in fact there can be little doubt
166that the member states simply saw the EU as a convenient forum in which to act in
167creating such mechanisms. Mutual recognition procedures are precisely distinct after
168all in featuring no supra-national agency pushing such measures. Nevertheless they
169have added a European dimension to cases which utilise them. Their use has in turn
170highlighted the differences in domestic systems necessitating the development of a
171broader European dimension; one of minimum constitutional standards and not
172featuring the relevant checks and balances to counter-act the potential unfairness of
173efficiencies caused e.g. by use of the EAW. As is explored in what follows, we are
174some way off seeing this kind of balance in the EU criminal justice realm. Given,
175however, that the member states, and above all practitioners within their criminal
176justice systems, are certainly loath to give up the EAW as a tool, this is surely a
177process irreversibly underway.9
178Beyond the criminal law
179The procedures and mechanisms to which the above analysis applies are in fact
180restricted not only to those affecting criminal procedure in strictu sensu. Perhaps most
181famously the EU forum has also been used to ensure areas of law—not entirely
182uncontroversially expressly characterised as non-criminal—are formed to ensure a
183comprehensive counter-terrorist strategy. This has included a variety of activity
184relating e.g. to money laundering [65], civil aviation security [67], restricting the
185purchase of ammonium nitrate [58].
186Famously and controversially EU legislation has also contradicted previous EU
187policy [45; p.6] to provide for the retention of email and telecommunication traffic
188data [66] and to provide for closer cooperation with third states (US Agreement, PNR
189Agreements with Australia, US, etc. SWIFT agreement on which see Pfisterer [98]).
8 See http://www.fairtrials.net/justice-in-europe/eu-defence-rights/. Accessed 24 June 2013.
9 It is precisely this sort of momentum which apparently concerns Eurosceptic British politicians who
recognise that even measures introduced as exceptional and proven worthwhile, may cause a gravitational
pull to further development. This may be regarded as natural or the more pejoratively titled “competence
creep” with which the EU is often associated and indeed organs such as the European Court of Justice
accused of driving [105].
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190Data protection concerns are still the subject of heated discussion relating to PNR
191agreements; the S.W.I.F.T. legislation caused rifts between the legislative organs of
192the EU (with the European Parliament rejecting the proposed agreement—see
193Pignal [99]) whilst the Data Retention Directive caused member states not
194usually renowned for their rebellious nature to fall foul of Commission litiga-
195tion for non-compliance [62].
196The EU has also (alongside the UN) been the scene of quasi-criminal measures
197introduced to restrict the capacities of persons and organisations associated with
198terrorist groupings [12, 13] and amending acts10as well as legal battles contradicting
199their legitimacy.11 . The asset freezing mechanisms viewed by the international
200community and clearly also the EU member states as vital to ensuring the effective
201combating of terrorism were also provided for via EU legislation demonstrating the
202EU’s status as an actor in this forum. The member states use of the EU in this context
203can be interpreted either as recognising that the EU provides a more reliable context
204for such activity and ensuring its implementation than the UN or indeed a desire to
205ensure the EU is not outstripped (or remains comprehensive) as an actor in this area.
206The unique—if extremely awkward—position of the EU as a liberty-based supra-
207national conglomerate was, however, highlighted in this area by the European Court
208of Justice’s rulings in the Kadi 12litigation [83, 108] This area of law in particular
209shows the tension between the desires member state governments may have in
210relation to utilising the EU as a counter-terrorist actor and the fledgling identity of
211the EU as an emerging criminal justice actor in the broader sense. The former would
212perhaps allow for more exceptional work of an intergovernmental nature (and thereby
213see the EU merely as another forum in which transnational treaties are forged. The
214latter, however, requires a more holistic, constitutionally balanced setting as is
215discussed infra).
216Clearly the European Union has developed as a comprehensive counter-
217terrorism actor. This status has ramifications for its external policies and in its
218relationship with member states on a broad basis a few legislative examples of
219which have been discussed here. Interestingly in developing the current frame-
220work for criminal justice activity, the Stockholm Programme [40], emphasis was,
221however, placed elsewhere. Thus it is emphasised “Full use should be made of
222Europol, SitCen and Eurojust in the fight against terrorism.”[40; p.88] Further-
223more the importance of the role of the counter-terrorism coordinator is
224reaffirmed later in the document [40; p.85]. This highlights the importance of
225another feature of the EU counter-terrorism strategy: namely the institutional
226aspects. The shifting relationship between member states and the EU and
227developments of EU law can often be connected with institutional developments
228at the supra-national level.
10 Also see <http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/
l24402_en.htm#Amendingacts> and <http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/
fight_against_terrorism/l33208_en.htm> for amending acts respectively.
11 KADI and OTHER v. COUNCIL and COMMISSION (Application no. C-402/05), judgment of the
European Court of Justice on 3 September 2008, OJ C 285/2 of 8 November 2008.
12 Ibid
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229Institutionalisation
230Clearly the EU’s influence upon member states via agreed changes to the law must be
231regarded as demarking it as (at least some powerful) member states’ forum of choice
232for counter-terrorism legislative work and has seen it advance as an actor of this kind
233in this policy area. It is probably uncontroversial to assert that such legislative
234changes impact particularly strongly upon legal systems which are different to those
235from which the principle ideas stemmed. It is interesting further to observe consid-
236erable impact upon legal systems of those countries which wish to join the Union.
237Thus we can see the Framework Decisions status as part of the acquis to be adopted
238by countries joining in the last major expansion of the EU (2004 onwards) meant very
239significant changes were made to the criminal law as a side effect of EU integration
240[46, 90]. One may well speculate that the EU’s economic power will also mean this
241aspect of external policy is lent particular leverage via the EU potentially leading the
242member states to wishing to utilise the EU as a counter-terrorist actor vis a vis third
243states. This is not an aspect which can be explored here but such activity would
244naturally add a strong, further dimension to the EU’s profile as a counter-terrorist
245actor [89].
246A more subtle influence, which might potentially be more even-handed (though
247naturally more powerful member states will always be better positioned to resist
248influence if it is noticed and taken exception to) is imaginable via institutionalisation.
249It is interesting to note that whilst the member states were careful to emphasise their
250sovereignty and ensure the possibility to take back powers from the Union in the
251Treaty of Lisbon (see in particular Treaty of the European Union [6; articles 4,5 and
25248(2)]), they simultaneously endowed a number of EU-level institutions with in-
253creased powers. Some of these sit within the Council and are thus inter-governmental
254in nature, others are, however, genuinely supra-national. In particular the status of
255bodies such as Europol and Eurojust are clearly shifting towards becoming EU
256agencies. Their enhancement can thus be seen as strengthening the EU level’s hand.
257In what follows the nexus between this strengthening and counter-terrorism are
258explored.
259Following a special meeting in the wake of the Madrid bombings, Article 14 of the
260Council Declaration on Combating Terrorism of the 25th March 2004 provided for a
261Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator [19] to work within the Council (upon appoint-
262ment by the High Representative) to “co-ordinate the work of the Council in
263combating terrorism and… maintain an overview of all the instruments at the Union’s
264disposal” as well as to “closely monitor the implementation of the EU Action Plan on
265Combating Terrorism and to secure the visibility of the Union’s policies in the fight
266against terrorism.” [19; art. 14]. Whilst no co-ordinating role was directly assigned to
267this office, it is clear that the member states wished to create a high-level overview of
268their respective policies [25]. The first Co-ordinator Gijs de Vries resigned in 2007
269apparently due to frustration at the member states’ security agencies lacking the will
270to co-operate [80]. Nevertheless this office continues to work actively under the
271auspices of Giles de Kerhove with the office reconfirmed by the Stockholm Pro-
272gramme and now defined as to: “coordinate the work of the Council of the EU in the
273field of counter-terrorism, maintain an overview of all the instruments at the Union’s
274disposal, closely monitor the implementation of the EU counter-terrorism strategy,
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275fostering better communication between the EU and third Countries and ensure that
276the Union plays an active role in the fight against terrorism.” (). The discussion paper
277emphasised the need for improvements relating to travel safety, cyber-terrorism
278response and the combating of discrimination against and the social marginalisation
279of Muslims [39]. Clearly the counter-terrorism coordinator has taken on a broad role
280on the member states behalf.
281A further, informal form of institutionalisation is to be found at the Council in the
282guise of the Situation Centre, known as SitCen. This is an informal organisation of
283inter-governmental character situated within the Council. The ‘new’ Sitcen, which
284became operational in 2005, was distinct from its predecessor because its activities
285were no longer limited to the material falling within the ambit of the former “2nd
286pillar” (common foreign affairs and the European defence area). This expansion is
287particularly relevant because it related directly to areas belonging to the now defunct
2883rd pillar; the criminal justice relevant part of Union work.
289SitCen is concerned with intelligence and is a contact centre for the member states’
290and third states’ intelligence services. It is to be found within the Council Secretariat
291and is composed of analysts from member states’ external and internal security
292services. Their task is to assess any terrorist threat developing within the European
293Union or externally As it is an informal entity, very little information can be gleaned
294about it. It would appear, however, to have grown from an agency of 3 assistants and
2952 administrators in 2001 which hosted a modest number of delegated agents in years
296prior to that to having a staff of 110 in 2010 [100] with Ikka Salmi appointed its
297Director in 2011.13 This body’s existence alone and its increased status bears witness
298to the changed expectations placed upon the EU governance level in the counter-
299terrorism context even if maintained in an informal context.
300Although such informal developments are doubtlessly important and demonstrate
301the EU’s significance, they arguable signal it merely as a forum within which the
302member states choose to operate. The power exercised remains within the sovereign
303power of the member states albeit in a context in which this is expressed in common
304with other states. The EU has, however, also been the stage of significant formal and
305supranational institutionalisation. Thus in 2009 the European Police Office, Europol
306became the Law Enforcement Agency of the EU.
307Europol is one of the older institutions within the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
308policy area formed upon the initiative of the member states, initially as the European
309Drug Office (first created by Ministerial agreement in June 1993 [96; p.536]) before
310being created by the Europol Convention of 1995 which came into force on the 1st
311October 1998. It was funded as an inter-governmental project, i.e. directly by the
312member states and was thus an example of inter-governmental JHA work in the
313Maastricht period. Europol began work on 1st of July 1999. In June 2007 the
314Presidency confirmed the JHA Council decision to reform the Europol Convention
315[36]. This followed a detailed discussion process which is in part still ongoing, after
316which the JHA Council of the time endorsed the Commission’s proposal and replaced
317the Europol Convention by a Council Decision in 2009. With this Europol became
318incorporated into the legal framework of the EU meaning that it is now financed from
13 His CV available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede041011
cvsalmi_/sede041011cvsalmi_en.pdf
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319the general budget and staff fall under EC Staff Regulations and the Protocol on the
320Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities. In other words Europol
321became an EU agency. As such it is still currently undergoing a very significant
322transformation process.
323Initially the Convention stated “Europol shall initially act to prevent and combat
324unlawful drug trafficking, trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances, illegal
325immigrant smuggling, trade in human beings and motor vehicle crime.” The Council
326always, however, retained the power to lend Europol competence over any further
327serious international crimes by unanimous decision and this power was used to lend
328Europol competence for terrorism as soon as it took up its work. The 2009 Decision
329witnessed Europol’s mandate expanded to cover all forms of serious cross-border
330crimes,14 i.e. the restriction to organised crime and terrorism fell away. Nevertheless
331the importance of counter-terrorism and Europol’s work in this context must be
332emphasised. Because, amongst other things, Europol has been able to demonstrate
333its added value in the counter-terrorism field—for which its work was clearly seen as
334vital—its powers have steadily expanded. Thus e.g. the 2009 Decision also tackled
335changes necessary to ensure Europol databases are inter-operable with member
336states’ national, the Schengen or visa information systems.
337The Europol Decision delineates competences in a similar, vein to the previous
338Convention whilst making additions to it. Article 3 states Europol’s objective as:
33940“to support and strengthen action by the competent authorities of the Member
341States and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating organised
342crime, terrorism and other forms of serious crime affecting two or more
343Member States.”
344
345Europol’s powers are essentially determined by the tasks the organisation is given
346by article 5 (1) of the Europol Decision. Europol’s major tasks lie in handling
347information its role being to:
348a) to collect, store, process, analyse and exchange information and intelligence;
349b) to notify the competent authorities of the Member States without delay via the
350national units referred to in Article 8 of information concerning them and of any
351connections identified between criminal offences;
352c) to aid investigations in the Member States by forwarding all relevant information
353to the national units;
354d) to ask the competent authorities of the Member States concerned to initiate,
355conduct or coordinate investigations and to suggest the setting up of joint
356investigation teams in specific cases;
357e) to provide intelligence and analytical support to Member States in connection
358with major international events;
359f) to prepare threat assessments, strategic analyses and general situation reports
360relating to its objective, including organised crime threat assessments.
361If one compares article 5 of the Decision to the formerly decisive article 3 of the
362Convention,15 it seems clear that Europol is acknowledged by the Decision as an
14 The meaning corresponding to those described in Art. 2(2) of the EAW Framework Decision. [17]
15 Article 3(1) point 6 Europol convention, added by Council Act of 28 November 2002 [14]
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363institution with a clear knowledge advantage over the Member States and much
364specific expertise. The sensitivity of the Member States in wishing to ensure their
365own policing authorities retain “real” or frontline policing powers is clearly expressed
366in the provisions concerning Europol participation in joint investigation teams16 and
367requests for the initiation of investigations (article 7). In relation to the latter, the
368duties of the Member States to afford requests “due consideration” and to inform
369Europol and indeed, usually, to justify to Europol if the request is not followed,
370demonstrate the desire that Europol carry significant clout whilst clearly acknowl-
371edging the primacy of Member State decisions.
372The steady evolution of Europol’s influence on the initiation of investigations can,
373however, also be regarded as indicative of growing power. Europol’s remit and
374expertise in the counter-terrorism context has been key in securing this influence
375and acceptance of it. Thus one can track e.g. the Council Act of 28 November 2002
376[14] adding article 3 b to the Europol Convention giving Europol the right to request
377that MS initiate investigations and obliging MS to inform Europol where a decision is
378made not to follow the request (unless this presents a danger to national security or
379would endanger a current investigation). The Decision has strengthened this aspect of
380Europol’s work by introducing requests to initiate investigations as a core task backed
381up by Member States’ obligations to respond to such requests. Though Europol’s
382position is clearly subservient, it doubtlessly grew stronger post 9/11.
383The priorities of Europol’s analysis work can change every year. These have tradi-
384tionally included counter terrorism, with this often, as in 2005, being the priority first
385mentioned [71; p. 5]. Whilst the determination of priorities drawing upon the Organised
386Crime Threat Assessment tool since 2006 has ensured organised criminal groups have
387also gained priority [72; p.6], the annual review (which replaced the report in 2009)
388continues to emphasise this work area as bearing the highest importance. In 2010
389terrorism remained the first work priority set by the Council [74; p.7]. Organised crime
390and terrorism remain high on the Europol agenda with the annual threat assessments (for
391terrorism the so-called TE-SAT) published in these areas attracting much attention.
392The Europol Decision brings together in one legal basis many developments which
393had occurred upon ad hoc legal bases. For example, previously Europol staff can
394become members of Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) on the basis set out in a special
395protocol [14] (which also provided a power to initiate investigations by requesting the
396relevant member state do so); the creation of one singular, legal basis providing for
397such activity is surely to be taken as a consolidated expression of confidence in
398Europol. Although the Decision is, as stated above, at pains to reserve certain roles
399for Member States’ criminal justice practitioners, it is interesting to note that this
400decision emphasises this constellation in which Europol staff can become operative.
401As members of an investigation team working according to the rules of the country in
402which the JIT operates (see article 6(1)). The Decision was drafted in an environment
403of the Justice and Home Affairs Council of Luxemburg encouraging MS to “invite
404Europol to participate in JIT whenever possible and useful” [28] and with both
405Europol and Eurojust making concerted efforts to ensure JITs are used more fre-
406quently as well as the Commission dedicating significant funds to them. Given
16 See article 6, this is particularly true in relation to the use of coercive powers which Europol staff “shall
not … take part in.”
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407Europol’s specialist nature and superior access to information (the processing of
408which constitutes a hugely important proportion of police work), one might also note
409that the power to suggest the opening of investigations to national criminal justice
410system institutions arguably comes close to operational powers. During reform
411discussions former Director Rätzel for example was careful to emphasise Europol’s
412role as to facilitate exchange rather than to seek operational powers[69; Ratzel’s
413Speech] but only time will tell what profile Europol will adopt. Whilst the MS’s will
414was clearly to ensure central decisions are still made by their authorities, the Europol
415Decision provides for an EU policing agency with the right to be heard and whose
416request can only be refused for good reason.
417It must be noted to that the new Decision is fundamental in its expansion of
418Europol’s mandate. The previous tie in of initial Europol work to terrorism or organised
419crime has been removed [36; Art. 4]. Clearly this will ease Europol’s ability to assist the
420member states in the investigation of cross-border crimes more generally. Article 13 (1)
421of the Decision also appears to fall in the same vein relieving the member states of the
422Convention’s requirement (article 7(1)) that the member state authorities must have a
423specific enquiry in order to access the full range of Europol information sources. Clearly
424the work Europol carried out also in the counter-terrorism context has led to the creation
425of expertise pushing the member states both to relinquish a certain degree of authority to
426Europol as well as to acknowledge the desirability of access to their work products.
427Counter-terrorism has thus also created push and pull factors to integration in this very
428concrete manner. It is interesting to note that this steady increase of the Europol remit
429runs in parallel to discussions in which supra-nationalisation is condemned as infringing
430too far upon member states’ sovereignty (and a clear emphasis of deference to the
431member states’ national authorities expressed in key legislative instruments such as
432article 88 (3) TFEU). Counter-terrorism can thus be viewed as a context factually and
433practically pushing integration even as member states hesitate over it in theory.
434That the Council went to significant lengths to ensure Europol relevant
435legislation was passed prior to the Lisbon Treaty coming into force adds
436something to our consideration of this agency. One can only speculate whether
437the passing of these acts the day before the latter occurred was to ensure the
438sensitive work Europol performs—also in the counter-terrorism context—was
439kept out of the controversy anticipated under the Lisbon regime (and indeed
440now made all too prominent reality by the UK opt-out discussion—see Spencer
441[106]). On the day the new Decision was passed, so was legislation introducing
442the rules governing confidentiality of Europol information [35] for analysis work
443files [34] and laying out rules for the exchange of information with partners
444including the exchange of personal data and classified information [32]. The
445latter regulated the means to draw up agreements with EU bodies an third
446parties, providing a procedure for this, regulating any receipt of information
447taking place before an agreement is reached and setting out the conditions for
448the onward transmission of information to EU agencies and third parties [33].
449This final power has proved of particular importance in the counter-terrorism
450context with the Director of Europol using exceptional powers to pass relevant
451data to the US. This is important not only because of the political trust and
452power ultimately placed in Europol by the member states in relation to data and
453this politically sensitive area [see 32; article 14] but also because of the external
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454impression therewith created. Of course partners such as the US will prefer the
455“one-stop shop” arrangement of data-exchange with Europol rather than 27 plus
456member states. This precedent, though utterly exceptional and explained merely
457by the specific-nature and political high-profile of counter-terrorism in transat-
458lantic relations of the last decade, will likely bear further external conse-
459quences, pushing the EU’s status as an external facing criminal justice agent.
460The impact of work in the high-profile counter-terrorism area in undeniably
461significant for institutional development.
462There can be no denying that the member states’ desire to ensure all Europol-
463relevant legislation was finalised on the day before the Treaty of Lisbon came into
464force also emphasises a desire to ensure this area retains an intergovernmental nature
465for as long as possible. The effect of this timing was to ensure the role played by the
466European Parliament in the legislative process was the pre-Lisbon minimum and that
467Europol’s work is exempt from European Court of Justice scrutiny for a 5 year
468transition period (ending 1st December 2014). The Europol Decision and e.g. the
469data reporting duties placed on the member states by it (article 7) doubtlessly places
470obligations upon the latter for which time was required for appropriate adjustment,
471nevertheless the effort made to avoid this additional accountability is remarkable. In
472the longer term, however, with these reforms, the member states committed them-
473selves to a, albeit slowed, path to supra-nationalisation which cannot but be regarded
474as highly marked by their desire to ensure effective work at this level in the counter-
475terrorism context.
476In terms of the assignment of the ultimately controversial operational powers,
477Europol agents clearly ordinarily remain without these. Article 88 of the TFEU does,
478however, provide for the novel possibility that Europol carry out operational action
479jointly with MS authorities or in the context of joint investigative teams (article
48088(2)b of the TFEU). The scope of this contribution means this activity cannot be
481explored here but it is regarded as significant, particularly given the very significant
482growth in the use of JITs since Europol and Eurojust established a programme to
483promote them and house specialist units supporting member states in all aspects of
484establishing them. Where Europol (or indeed Eurojust) contribute to the financing of
485such teams, the participation of one of their agents (staff respectively) becomes
486mandatory [48, 53] and whilst these are ad hoc, inter-governmental measures, the
487factually important role played by supra-national bodies is significant. Again in
488this context the member states’ desire to work together closely in the counter-
489terrorism context must be seen as driving factual integration and with it a very
490gradual establishment of expertise at the European level facilitating a seismic
491shift in power.
492Like Europol Eurojust—the “judicial cooperation unit of the EU” – has featured
493terrorism as a priority crime area since its creation. The importance of this link is
494perhaps not as key possibly because Eurojust as service and support body for judicial
495institutions when investigating and prosecuting crimes has no preventive remit [78,
49681]. It is, however, perhaps more obviously on the member states’ radar with this
497“body of the Union” established as that “from” which a European Public Prosecutor’s
498Office shall grow by article 86 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the Union. In as far
499as one regards the counter—terrorism priorities of the member states as behind the
500introduction of mutual recognition based instruments, however, one may in turn
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501recognise these as facilitating an increase in Eurojust’s influence. It is this organ
502prosecutors across Europe turn to when an EAWor a request for evidence (of the kind
503which will certainly be covered by the EIO) does not meet the required response.17
504Interestingly therefore even the introduction of special mechanisms, like mutual
505recognition, in core designed to avoid supranational institutionalisation, may be seen
506as driving precisely this in the longer term.
507Terrorism forms a focal point of work at Eurojust with the current College
508President, Michèle Coninsx, an expert for this area and the organisation regularly
509contributing to Europol’s TE-Sat [52; p.27]. However, terrorism cases form only a
510relatively small proportion of the cases handled by this body, dwarfed recently e.g. by
511the number of references in drug smuggling and fraud cases [52; p.59 and 78].
512Between 2004 and 2008 the number of cases (and the relative caseload proportion)
513was not surprisingly significantly higher [73; p.23]. This work, however, does not
514mark Eurojust’s existence in the same way it has Europol’s . This is certainly likely to
515be not only because such cases are fewer and because such prosecutions are likely
516lent extremely high priority at domestic level in any case but also because Eurojust
517does not perform a strategic informational role in the way in which Europol has
518established itself.
519Being the body the proposed Constitution (article III-274) intended and which the
520Lisbon Treaty (article 86) demarked a European public prosecutor (EPP) to grow
521“from”, Eurojust is, however, clearly the EU’s foremost prosecution related body18
522and the seed from which a supra-national agency is most likely to grown. It was
523formed in 2002 by Council Decision on the 28th of February [15], as a co-ordinating
524instance only, however, taking over from Pro-Eurojust [10]. Its website introduces the
525organisation as “the European Union’s Judicial Co-operation Unit.” It was referred to
526in the same way by article 29 TEC (as amended by the Treaty of Nice) which stated
527its position as one means to ensure “closer cooperation between judicial and other
528competent authorities of the Member States” and thereby contribute to the achieve-
529ment of an area of freedom, security and justice; a statement now paraphrased by
530article 85 TFEU.
531Eurojust’s objective is defined more closely in article 3 of the Eurojust Decision as
532being to “stimulate and improve the coordination” “in the context of investigations
533and prosecutions, concerning two or more Member States of criminal behaviour
534referred to in Article 4.” These are: crimes and offences for which Europol is always
535competent to act under article 4(1) of the Europol Decision and the relevant annex
536[36; II.B.1] as well as auxiliary offences thereto. Eurojust’s caseload has more than
537tripled between 2002 and 2006 [49; p.24] with a surge of cases swelling its work
538volume to over 1000 cases in 2007.19 This number has continued to grow steadily
539reaching 1424 cases in 2010 [51; p.76].
540Eurojust can act through its National Members to request various actions from the
541competent authorities in member states e.g. to investigate, prosecute or to form a joint
17 Thus Eurojust dealt with 259 cases concerning the execution of EAWs in 2012. See [52; p.8]
18 Indeed it has already been declared the forbearer of a European prosecutor—see Dieckmann [47; p.620].
19 Eurojust1000 new cases so far this year. [50]as well as the analysis showing a 42 % increase in cases for
Jan-mid June 2007 as compared to the same period in 2006, see Kennedy [88]
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542investigation team, to ensure MS authorities inform each other about investigations
543and prosecutions, to assist MS authorities to achieve “the best possible coordination”,
544(with college agreement) to assist investigations and prosecutions, forward requests
545for judicial assistance, etc. [15; Art. 6]. Article 7 empowers Eurojust to similar
546activities acting as a College.
547In a parallel development to Europol, fairly recent reform of Eurojust is
548likely to place this body in an informationally and practically more powerful
549position as the 2009 Eurojust Decision requires the member states to provide
550certain information to Eurojust (they have always been empowered by article 13
551to exchange any relevant data with Eurojust but this article’s wording was
552changed from “may” to “shall”); with the following set out as cases in which
553information exchange shall take place: where a JIT is formed [15; Art.13(5)],
554where cases involve at least three MS in which requests for judicial cooperation
555have been transmitted to at least two MS [15; Art. 13(6)] as well as other
556problematical cases, e.g. involving conflict of jurisdiction [15; Art. 13(7)]. This
557provision is viewed as key by many national members as it results in member
558states duty to provide Eurojust with any information on criminal investigations
559necessary for its work. Furthermore, member states are required by article 8 to
560provide Eurojust with their reason for a refusal to comply with a request. Again
561this may be seen as a subtle factual change to power-relations within the
562Union.
563A significant change as to Eurojust’s position as the European Judicial Co-
564operation unit may further be perceived in relation to powers assigned to it vis a vis
565third states. Article 27a provides that the College may post liaison magistrates to third
566countries in order to facilitate judicial cooperation and, where the MS concerned
567agree (although currently it is the role of liaison magistrates at Eurojust—from
568Croatia, Norway and the USA—which is prominent—see Eurojust [52;p.36]),
569Eurojust may coordinate the execution of requests for judicial cooperation issued
570by a third State, where these requests form part of the same investigation and require
571execution in at least two MS [15; Art. 27(b)]. Again the external-facing impact of this
572organ, may be of key significance for its further development.
573The particularly terrorism-related point is that Eurojust—like other EU agencies
574involved in criminal justice, is in a state of continued development. The agency has
575been strengthened firstly by the Treaty of Lisbon and then again by a new Eurojust
576Decision in 2009. Whilst (post-Lisbon) article 85 TFEU continues to emphasise to
577Eurojust’s central mission as supporting and strengthening coordination and cooper-
578ation between national investigating and prosecuting authorities, article 85(1)(a)–(c)
579TFEU also provides potential for Eurojust to initiate criminal investigations as well as
580authority to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction and thus for significant novelty.20 The
581wording of article 85 is fairly loose, however, leaving flexibility for the Council and
582European Parliament as to how they legislate for the structure and activities of
583Eurojust. In formulating the Treaty the member states did clearly express a standpoint
584that they do not wish Eurojust to become a supranational body with operational
585powers within an area defined as a common territory. Any such development is
20 See e.g. Hamdorf [79;p.74]
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586reserved for the future European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) as provided for in
587article 86 TFEU (see infra)[111; p.182].
588The potential terrorism has as a(t least a co-) driver for change could,
589however, be perceived for example in 2007 the Commission issued a Com-
590munication on the role of Eurojust and the European Judicial Network in the
591fight against organised crime and terrorism in the European Union .21 It is
592interesting to see the way in which European criminal justice dialogue is cased in
593terms of these crime types. In this Communication, the importance of Eurojust’s role
594was emphasised and in particular the need to consider aligning National Member’s
595powers and terms of appointment to ensure the body’s working as efficiently as possible
596in the fight against these types of crime highlighted. A number of these suggestions were
597realised with the 2009 Decision with those put aside likely to mark discussion in the near
598future[111; p.183]Above all, the potential for supra-nationalisation through article 86
599should any terrorism-related need be felt is clearly given. Para. 4. Of article 86 TFEU
600provides:
6012The European Council may, at the same time or subsequently, adopt a decision
603amending paragraph 1 in order to extend the powers of the European Public
604Prosecutor's Office to include serious crime having a cross-border dimension and
605amending accordingly paragraph 2 as regards the perpetrators of, and accomplices
606in, serious crimes affecting more than one Member State. The European Council
607shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament and
608after consulting the Commission.
609
610Terrorism is thus very clearly a crime which may be assigned into the remit of an
611EPPO. This topic can be regarded as intimately linked with political pressures felt by
612the member states. Thus at times during the past decade, commentators have held a
613counter-terrorism EPPO for the form most likely to be formed and one might well
614speculate that such a likelihood would return should the misfortune of a major
615terrorist attack occur on Union territory. There can be no clearer indicator of
616counter-terrorist policy as driving EU integration and, in this case, overcoming
617fundamental hurdles due to the pressure member states then perceive themselves to
618be under. It should be noted that the EAWwas pushed through against the concerns of
619member states who felt it must be accompanied by balancing legislation on suspects’
620rights (and indeed who agreed the EAW legislation conditionally upon this being
621passed immediately afterwards). That was undoubtedly a watershed in European
622criminal law; one which 9/11 facilitated.
623It must be noted at this point that terrorism is distinctly not a topic in this
624context at the moment. The Commission is currently taking great care to ensure
625the EPPO debate is linked solely to the protection of the EU’s financial
626interests [112; p. 445] and not to the expansive possibilities of article 4. Should
627the political situation present itself, there is, however, no doubt that terrorism
628could be a driver and the increasing profile and experience of Eurojust likely to
629be extremely relevant.
21 COM(2007) 644 final [56] also incorporating a number of the suggestions made in Council document
13079/07 [27] e.g. the full implementation of the Eurojust decision, uniform powers, binding character for
Eurojust’s requests and the relationship with the EJN.
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630The scope of this article does not lend itself to exploring the full extent of terrorism
631related institutionalisation within the EU. With the main examples highlighted above,
632the nexus can, however be clearly drawn and this aspect of the growing role played
633by the EU level highlighted. There are plenty of further examples which one may
634regard as driven also by the need to cooperate in counter-terrorism cases (or, for the
635more cynically minded, which one may view as couched in these terms to make them
636more palatable). Even the more informally driven European Judicial Network (for-
637mally established by a Joint Action of the 29th June 1998 [9]) stated its aim to
638facilitate effective judicial co-operation within the Union in general as well as for
639specific forms of serious crime such as organised crime, corruption, drug trafficking
640or terrorism [9;Art.2(1)]. Indeed, even OLAF—the Anti-Fraud Office of the Europe-
641an Commission, has, on occasion emphasised the potential for a counter-terrorist
642aspect of its work; such is the currency of this topic.
643The most important point to acknowledge, however, is the way in which opera-
644tional benefit is clearly seen to be gained via Europeanisation of this work. The topic
645may have political currency but it is clear also that practitioners bring terrorism-
646related work to the European institutions and regard these as providing them with
647added value in turn. Undeniably the importance and high-profile of counter-terrorism
648cases in the last two decades can be seen to have driven European integration at an
649institutional level also making the EU a counter-terrorism actor of high practical
650importance. Seen in historical perspective, this is, of course, anything but surprising.
651Already in the 1970’s the TREVI groupings [95; p.13 et seq] were utilising the EU
652predecessor structures to discuss operational aspects of counter-terrorism work and
653indeed, terrorism is arguably THE transnational crime [5] to which considerable
654energy is devoted. Nevertheless, there can be no denying that the institutional aspects
655of the EU’s counter-terrorism profile make this a particularly remarkable
656development.
657Soft law and institutionalisation
658Reflecting the status of the EU as a comprehensive counter-terrorism actor is the
659member states use of this forum for solutions beyond the law. Thus the last ten years
660bear witness to the EU simply as a venue in which the member states make
661agreements and declarations; plans for action without any binding legal force
662but—presumably—with efficient impact.
663Thus the EU not only features a common 4 pronged counter-terrorism strategy
664since 2005 (prevent, protect, pursue, respond—see [22, 26]) but also features mea-
665sures such as the “EU Action Plan for the Enhancement of the Security of Explo-
666sives” [57] leading to the European Bomb Data System at Europol as well as current
667projects such as an EU-wide early warning system [60] being developed to include
668threats and information on missing explosives, etc. Broad arrangement has and is
669being made (e.g. by Council Decision 2005/671/JHA [22]) for cooperation (for
670matters ranging from access to DNA databases, in relation to large-scale events
671and prevention [29]), information and data-exchange and the pooling of opera-
672tional expertise. As article 75 TFEU demonstrates mechanisms to continue the
673development of freezing of funds via administrative measures are likely to be a field of
674future action.
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675Just as this softer law can be seen to complete the web in which specific
676criminal justice legislation operates, so informal contact opportunities surround
677formal institutionalisation. Thus for example the Police Chiefs Operational Task
678Force was to be found in this context. Established in spring 2000 based upon a
679decision set out in the Conclusions from Tampere, this Task Force has never
680been placed on any EU legal basis but met regularly apparently discussing joint
681operations and making recommendations relating to Council policy [97; p.926–
682927]. In 2004 a decision was made that Task Force decisions relating to
683operational matters were to be made within the Europol framework—again
684emphasising Europol’s operational influence, although the Task Force continued
685to meet within the Council framework when strategic matters were being
686discussed [21]. Documentation of meetings was not made public. Since the
687establishment of the COSI committee, the Chief of Police Officers Task Force
688has been amalgamated into this structure. The need for distinct, operational
689police discussions is, however, reportedly still felt so it is possible that further
690developments will follow in the future.
691In this context, attention can also be drawn to the above mentioned Joint
692Investigation Teams (JITs). These may in fact be seen as a potential alternative
693to European institutionalisation of trans-national investigatory matters. They are
694legislated for in articles 13 to 16 of the 2000 Convention on Mutual Assistance
695in Criminal Matters which came into force on the August 23rd 2005 (due to
696slow ratification progress they were also provided for in the interim by Council
697Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams [18] which
698lapsed with that entry into force). These provide that two or more member
699states may make agreements to set up JITs for a specific purpose and a limited
700time period where complicated actions with links to other states or coordinated,
701concerted action is necessary (article 13 (1)). The actions of the team and
702procedures used are determined by the laws of the country in which it was
703set up [11; Art. 14]. MSs not participating in the set-up agreement can second
704agents to a JIT [11; Art 13(4), (5) & (6)]. Members of JITs who are not
705nationals of the country in which they are operating are to be treated as such
706“with respect of offences committed against or by them.” [11; art. 15] Members
707of Europol, Eurojust and OLAF can also be seconded to JITs. The initiative to
708provide for JITs stems from the Council of Tampere in which the MSs called
709for JITs to be set up without delay to combat the trafficking with drugs, human
710beings and terrorism.
711In parallel to the mutual recognition instruments, however, even this development
712can be related to stronger EU level institutionalisation and thus, at least in the long run,
713supra-nationalisation. Thus since 2007 the inclusion of Europol staff wherever possible
714is encouraged [11]. Furthermore, the increased use of JITs is to be connected with
715European institutions. By 2007 approximately 30 JITs mainly used for terrorism and
716drug cases had reportedly been or were in action [88]. The 2012 Eurojust Annual Report
717mentions no terrorism related JIT- [52; p.34], nor does the Europol Annual Review 2011
718[75; p. 28–29]. They are thus far from an instrument to be related to counter-terrorism
719although one may note the timing of increased momentum in developing them. They
720were apparently not being used as often as they might be in the past, reportedly due to
721the complexity [101, 102, 116] and expense of setting them up. Thus a Network was set
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722up22 to provide at least one expert contact point to provide assistance in each MS and as
723seen supra Europol and Eurojust took on key roles encouraging their use. Indeed these
724organs undertook a joint initiative to promote their use and have produced a guide to
725Member States legislation on JITs [48, 53]. In recent years efforts to ensure JITs are used
726more frequently have redoubled with Europol and Eurojust taking a far more pro-active
727stance in this context.
728JITs are now a prominent feature on both Europol and Eurojust websites with
729funding also being made available to assist MS in establishing these.23 A further
730facilitating step was the publication of a Eurojust and Europol JIT Manual [37]
731in September 2009 which provides comprehensive information on the legal basis
732and pre-conditions for setting up a JIT, as well as advice as to when JITs can be
733sensibly utilised.
734This perspective perhaps provides insight into how a number of mechanisms,
735whether key criminal law or procedural mechanism, institutionalisation or a softer
736law/quasi-institutionalisation context contributes to the EU’s development as a more
737holistic counter-terrorism actor of great significance. In what follows the broader
738impact of this development is examined and analysed.
739The state of counter-terrorism
740The defining feature of counter-terrorism policy is that it sees governments facing an
741exceptional situation. Low probability, high-risk incidents programmed to create
742terror amongst the population are bound to place governments and security forces
743under great pressure to prevent terrorist attacks.
744Facing this pressure in the past decades, governments have regularly resorted
745to exceptional measures. The British situation is often used to illustrate such a
746point. It should be noted that the UK has a long tradition of exceptionalism in
747reaction to the IRA terrorist threat of the last century [77; p.1331 et seq.]. Much
748attention has been paid to the regime for preventive detention: evolving first
749from the detention without trial scheme for foreign, non-deportable (regulated by
750Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 [1; s. 23]) scheme struck down by
751the House of Lords in 2005,24 to control orders and now to the TPIMS25 The
752actual (up to 28 days [schedule 8 of the 2000 TA (amended by section 23 of
7532006 TA and Code H of PACE), now amended by the Protection of Freedoms
754Act and reduced to 14 days]) and proposed detention without charge schemes
755(with 90 days discussed [84; p.8])., 42 debated before Parliament [103] as well
756as the shoot-to-kill policy operated by British police, have been equally
757headline-grabbing [91, 92].
758In fact, counter-terrorism policy has left the criminal law fundamentally changed
759with offences such as those provided for by sections 57 and 58 of the Terrorist Act
22 See Council Document 11037/05 [23] and http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=content_
jit&item=jit_role_national_experts.
23 See “JIT Funding Project” website, at http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/jit_funding.htm, . Also de Moor
[42; p.95] and Eurojust [52; p.35 et seq]
24 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56
25 See Hunt, A. (This volume)
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7602000 (criminalising possession for terrorist purposes26 and the collection (as well as
761possession) of information likely to be useful to terrorists27 respectively) as well as
762section 5 of the 2006 Terrorist Act (which criminalises any conduct undertaken to
763realise an intention to commit acts of terrorism or to assist the commission of such
764acts28) casting the net of criminalisation very wide. Section 38b of the 2000 Terrorism
765Act adds effective reverse burdens of proof to this mixture imposing criminal liability
766on anyone who has information which they know or believe might be of “material
767assistance” in preventing an act of terrorism or “securing the apprehension, prosecu-
768tion or conviction of another person” (within the UK) who was involved in “the
769commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism”29 and do not report this
770to the police and provide them with the relevant information. Considering the UK
771approach to counter-terrorism is also explicitly not limited to the criminal law but
772considered a category of its own which also utilises the criminal law, such funda-
773mental changes to the criminal law are of particular significance.
774It is not only the UK, however, in which exceptionalist tendencies are to be seen.
775The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also been found legally
26 Section 57 reads: Possession for terrorist purposes.(1)A person commits an offence if he possesses an
article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that his possession is for a purpose
connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism.
(2)It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that his possession of
the article was not for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of
terrorism.
(3)In proceedings for an offence under this section, if it is proved that an article—
(a)was on any premises at the same time as the accused, or
(b)was on premises of which the accused was the occupier or which he habitually used otherwise than
as a member of the public,
the court may assume that the accused possessed the article, unless he proves that he did not know of
its presence on the premises or that he had no control over it.
27 Section 58 reads: Collection of information.
(1)A person commits an offence if—
(a)he collects or makes a record of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or
preparing an act of terrorism, or
(b)he possesses a document or record containing information of that kind.
(2)In this section “record” includes a photographic or electronic record.
(3)It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had a
reasonable excuse for his action or possession.
(4)A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a)on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years, to a fine or to
both, or
(b)on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, to a fine not
exceeding the statutory maximum or to both.
28 Section 5 reads:
Preparation of terrorist acts(1)A person commits an offence if, with the intention of—
(a)committing acts of terrorism, or
(b)assisting another to commit such acts,
he engages in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to his intention.
(2)It is irrelevant for the purposes of subsection (1) whether the intention and preparations relate to
one or more particular acts of terrorism, acts of terrorism of a particular description or acts of terrorism
generally.
(3)A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable, on conviction on indictment, to
imprisonment for life.
29 Section 38B (1)(a)&(b)
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776pushing and hotly debating the boundaries of its constitutions. Thus preventive
777detention is demonstrated by Mueller30 as a contentious issue in relation to which
778previously sacrosanct standards have been broken. The Federal Constitutional Court
779was required to revisit the meaning of human dignity, perhaps the central concept of
780the post-World War 2 German constitution in relation to the so called
781Luftsicherheitsgesetz (for details see [2] and [3, 4]). This case saw a successful
782challenge to legislation permitting the deliberate shooting down of a hijacked aircraft
783being steered by terrorists to ends paralleling the events of 9/11. According to the
784Constitutional Court the Constitution as it stands will not tolerate the utilisation of
785any single life as a means to an end even to save a greater number of lives.31 In the
786German context an act of Government and Parliament to attempt to legalise such
787action was a heavily criticised step well beyond the acceptable [82].
788Intervention by the Federal Constitutional Court was also required in relation to
789the highly controversial “online-searches.”32 These involve the installation of Trojans
790by law enforcement on private computers to enable the remote and clandestine search
791of that computer. Use of this measure is restricted to grave and international
792terrorism-related threats of the highest order and is intended above all for the
793purposes of prevention. Transfer of any evidence found to a prosecution agency
794may only occur to support the prosecution of a crime punishable by a minimum of
7955 years. A strong data protection regime involving on-going oversight by the BKA
796(Federal Police Office) data protection supervisor and two further public servants
797(one qualified to hold judicial office) to immediately inspect any data collected in
798order to determine whether it pertains to the core area of private life was created.
799Should they deem this kind of data to have been collected, it must be deleted
800immediately. Should a search be deemed capable only of collecting data of this kind
801it must cease forthwith [113].
802Counter-terrorism is clearly to be associated with well-established, democratic
803states introducing exceptional measures often considered beyond the boundaries of
804the constitutionally acceptable particularly to serve the purposes of prevention.
805Given that it is precisely the members of these executives which populate the
806highest organ of the EU, one cannot be surprised that this entity is in turn marked by
807the same spirit in the counter-terrorist context. As is clearly to be recognised from the
808above account, the EU has always been and become a repressive counter-terrorist
809forum/actor; serving broader criminalisation, facilitation of more efficient intelligence
810gathering and exchange, investigation and indeed prosecution. It has been ascribed an
811intelligence related role and a role supportive of prevention within an international
812network of solidarity. Given the high priority afforded to such issues by those
813populating the Council as first ministers of their member states or indeed the
814respective ministers of the interior, this is predictable and indeed correct. One could
815well argue the member states governments as being neglectful in their duty to protect
816their citizens were they not utilising the EU in this way. The problem is that this
817contexts highlights what the European Union is not.
30 Müller, T. (2013) Preventive Detention as a Counter-Terrorism Instrument in Germany, Crime, Law and
Social Change (this volume).
31 Judgment of the First Senate, 5th February 2006–1 BvR 357/05 -
32 Judgment of the First Senate, 27th February 2008–1 BvR 370/07 −/− 1 BvR 595/07 -
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818The counter-terrorism context is littered with statements reminding of the broader
819European constitutionalised criminal law tradition. Thus the Stockholm Programme
820for example states:
8212“Respect for the Rule of Law, fundamental rights and freedoms is one of the
823bases for the Union’s overall counter-terrorism work. Measures in the fight
824against terrorism must be undertaken within the framework of full respect for
825fundamental rights and freedoms so that they do not give rise to challenge.
826Moreover, all the parties concerned should avoid stigmatising any particular
827group of people, and should develop intercultural dialogue in order to promote
828mutual awareness and understanding.
829
830The Union must ensure that all tools are deployed in the fight against terrorism
831while fully respecting fundamental rights and freedoms. The European Council
832reaffirms its counter-terrorism strategy consisting of four strands of
833work—prevent, pursue, protect and respond—and calls for a reinforcement of
834the prevention strand.”[40; p.84]
835
836Nevertheless it is important to remember that all of the above described develop-
837ments run in parallel to the failed attempts develop a general declaration of procedural
838rights in criminal proceedings [54] and the now slowly progressing Roadmap rights
839development [38]as well as to constitutionalise the Union [109].
840What the EU doesn’t have
841Within the context of individual member states, counter-terrorist policies have been
842subject, as highlighted for the UK and Germany, to political debate of the most
843intensive nature. More often than not further to challenge before the courts, often as a
844constitutional issue of the highest order. Such kick-back has, however, mostly been
845absent from the EU level up to this point.
846This is, of course, entirely in keeping with the EU as the entity it is. The rejection
847of the Constitutional Treaty clearly illustrated that it is not a constitutional entity and
848as such correctly devoid of any court structure dedicated to upholding the sanctity of
849any such higher legal principle. Its much criticised lack of democratic legitimacy
850(fundamentally for lack of a demos, see e.g. [115]) also accounts for the pre-Lisbon
851lack of any political debate.
852Post-Lisbon the scenario is somewhat different. The European Parliament is
853changing given its role as co-legislator. It has indeed already demonstrated its
854potential power in relation to counter-terrorism relevant policy via its opposition in
855the SWIFT data exchange agreement [99]. National Parliaments have also been
856ascribed a role in overseeing EU policy meaning that we can expect some of the
857controversy to be found in national contexts reflected in post-Lisbon EU policy in the
858future. The inclusion of the European Charter into Union law via the Lisbon Treaty33
859and indeed the planned accession of the EU to the European Convention for the
860Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms should lead to a different
33 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm, and TEU [6; Art.6]
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861and justiciable rights discourse within the Union but this is currently embryonic. An
862assertion which cannot be mirrored vis counter-terrorist activity at the European level.
863Although not a constitutional court, the European Court of Justice stance in Kadi34
864is demonstrative of that court’s willingness and ability to step into such a role as
865necessary. As it gains jurisdiction over all legislation passed in the former third pillar
866at the end of 2014 [See Article 10 of Protocol No 36 on transitional provisions as well
867as [41]], this means the lack of a forum for such discourse in case law is likely to be
868rectified.
869The fundamental problem is one of imbalance. As has been shown, the EU has
870advanced to a sophisticated counter-terrorism actor and there are many grounds to
871believe this is rightly so. The atmosphere of exceptionalism has, however, meant that
872this development is associated with a number of negative, in part highly controver-
873sial, side-effects. Specific to the counter-terrorism context these are the data retention
874directive, passenger name record and swift privacy-related controversy discussed
875above. The broader discourse surrounding criminal justice at the EU level is also
876marked by controversy and fundamental criticism of this context, however. Above all
877the European level has been subject to continual criticism in the last years because of
878the almost purely repressive nature of the policies it facilitates. The efficiency of these
879stands in stark contrast to the lack of rights protection afforded to those who become
880subject to them.
881Individual cases demonstrate serious injustices resulting from this lack of balance.
882The case of Andrew Symeou provides a horrific example whilst that of e.g. Edmund
883Arapi held an equally dramatic potential [76; p.4-5]. Non-governmental organisations
884such as Fair Trials International and Justice therefore regularly publish to highlight
885the very real problems caused by this constellation [86] and particularly Fair Trials
886has started reform campaigns as a result.35 Associations of defence lawyers, such as
887the European criminal bar association also regularly express concern [64] meaning
888this broader work area is one recognised, also by EU organs, as at least imbalanced.36
889Thus, although few would seek to discredit the EU as a counter-terrorism actor,
890this role must be viewed as fundamentally dogged by the same shadow which hangs
891over all criminal justice related work. The ways in which the EU adds value to its
892member states counter-terrorist activities described above and by which it is therefore
893emerging as a more autonomous force are certainly persuasive and, via their grass-
894roots dependent development, in many ways to be assumed effective and legitimate.
895This fundamental, broader worry remains however. The European Union has its
896origins as a set of supra-national communities fundamentally bound to enhance the
897lives of citizens by ensuring peace and democratic values. The precise expectations
898placed upon it have revolutionised as the decades passed and are still in flux.
899Nevertheless it must be viewed with the deepest concerns that in this context; one
900which has proved constitutionally beyond challenging for the oldest of
901constitutionalised democracies, that precisely this indeterminate entity which draws
902its legitimacy from such lofty aims, has made leaps and bounds in only repressive
34 KADI and OTHER v. COUNCIL and COMMISSION (Application no. C-402/05), judgment of the
European Court of Justice on 3 September 2008, OJ C 285/2 of 8 November 2008.
35 See the various facets of the Justice in Europe campaign at http://www.fairtrials.net/justice-in-europe/
36 Thus the concentration on proportionality issues in the Commission review of the EAW [61] and the
steady work on defence rights, currently more successfully in the Roadmap process [38].
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903directions. As it stands the EU may be viewed as a counter-terrorist actor which can
904sprint before we are convinced it can keep its own balance, let alone walk.
905Conclusions and outlook
906Regardless of how one views the European Union or which developmental direction
907one considers appropriate for it, there is no denying that it has fundamentally changed
908in the counter-terrorism context. Although it looks back upon a long history of sorts
909in this context, the TREVI discussions of the 1970’s have little in common with the
910situation as it currently stands. The EU has quite simply become the Member States’
911forum of choice for transnational matters counter-terrorism. It is now within the EU
912context that they discuss defining the crime of terrorism and within which they
913develop innovative mechanisms and institutions, more or less formal exchange of
914information and intelligence as well as informal cooperation opportunities to deal
915with terrorism across borders. This status of the EU is to be recognised as both
916internal, i.e. when the member states act amongst themselves but also as an external-
917facing character when the member states are in negotiation with other states.
918Expertise in counter-terrorism has in this way been accumulated at the centralised
919European level and has indeed become supra-nationalised with the specialisation of
920EU bodies and agencies in this context. Thus the EU itself can be seen as a counter-
921terrorism actor. The supra-nationalised part of this work is very significantly backed
922up by less formal and softer mechanisms, some of which are still explicitly inter-
923governmental in nature. Nevertheless The EU doubtlessly stands as a significant
924counter-terrorism actor assisting some member states in pursuing their policies and
925processes far more efficiently whilst raising the profile of this policy area significant-
926ly in others. The existence of ever more institutions, networks and mechanisms
927surrounding the centralised more formal EU organs, no matter how inter-
928governmental in nature they currently are, is likely to fuel the centrifugal shift of
929power and strengthen the EU’s authority in this field over time.
930This may be seen to demonstrate the cumulative effect of having counter-terrorism
931activity of some kind at the supra-national level when political momentum is added to
932it. Doubtlessly the shift in focus and influence of the EU is convenient for the member
933states and reflective of the strongly perceived, globalised and different needs they
934faced in this context over the past decade. As demonstrated this is not, however, only
935convenient for the member states. Such development also gains momentum due to the
936benefits for significant partners. Thus the US government has for example responded
937very positively to dealing only with one contact point for 29 jurisdictions. This is turn
938naturally creates the expectation and at least gentle pressure for this convenience to be
939offered more broadly. And so policy and institutional reality may develop.
940Parallel to other developments, the EU’s counter-terrorism activities ensure other
941pressures arise. The expectations and desires placed on the EU by (at least the
942majority of) member states mean it as an institution is in a highly dynamic state of
943development. Post-Lisbon, the EU is changing. Precisely how well placed the
944European Court of Justice or national Parliaments will be to deal with tasks such as
945ensuring accountability of criminal justice organs [as foreseen by e.g. article 88(2)
946TFEU for Europol] remains to be seen but a fundamental change is underway and
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947necessary. These are institutions which have been tasked with rising to the challenges
948presented and which have indeed mastered many reform processes before. They are
949the organs to which we must turn to secure individual rights as well as accountable
950and acceptable processes, also in the counter-terrorism context. The challenge is great
951because the one-sided EU has a head start. Executive measures to change the criminal
952law, provide for informal information and data exchange, also with 3rd countries are
953in place and operating. Across EU bodies and institutions—from Europol to Frontex,
954and the informal interfaces it offers such as SitCen, the EU is working and facilitating
955efforts against terrorism. Instruments and mechanisms from the European Arrest
956Warrant to Europol’s TE-SAT threat assessment and JITs are increasingly better
957received and utilised, clearly demonstrating the benefits the EU as a counter-
958terrorism actor offers its member states. The EU has doubtlessly successfully sup-
959ported member states executives in counter-terrorism policy and there is evidence of
960significant benefit.
961The problem is that unchecked executives, so our common and diverse European
962history has taught us, are not always right. They serve also to undermine their own
963legitimacy. And thus far the EU as a counter-terrorist actor—and indeed more broadly
964as a criminal justice actor—has served only to magnify executive action and reach,
965the consequences of which are being and still to be faced. Some of the individuals
966badly served by the European Arrest Warrant are well known but there are likely
967other tales of misfortune to be told. How for example will EU citizens feel when
968denied entry to the US based upon data transferred to Homeland Security by Europol?
969This data stems from their member states, but the transfer was made by the Europol
970Director in the counter-terrorist context [32; Article 14] The EU was mandated to act
971by the member states but is also, clearly, the governance level which can be blamed.
972Furthermore, the effect upon citizens’ positions is not backed up by processes for
973clarification or rectification.37
974The broader picture is that the European Arrest Warrant and JITs may generally
975operate well, but defence rights limp behind and so the risk of unnecessary “collat-
976eral” damage remains high. How long will citizens accept that the Commission finds
977over 100 million to assign to Europol and Eurojust awarding financial support to JITs
97838whilst negotiations over access to a lawyer and legal aid falter because these are
979“matters for the budgets of the member states?39[so December?? 2012 -]”
980In the current position in which citizens are less concerned about terrorist attacks
981and perhaps more open to important campaigns such as those by FTI highlighting the
982injustices at least massively exacerbated by EU instruments, the question becomes
983whether the legitimacy of the EU is not at stake. This is only exacerbated by populist,
984Euro-sceptic political movements across Europe who, on a daily basis, apparently
985seek to discredit the EU by any means possible [106].
986Can we, in this political climate, trust the executives who negotiated or supported
987the developing profile of the EU as a repressive actor in counter-terrorism policy to
988honestly admit that it was they who shaped this profile? Will the UK government
37 Wade, M. at Making Europe Safer: Europol at the Heart of European Security Conference, The Hague,
19 June 2012 and (2013) Judicial Control: the CJEU and the Future of Eurojust, ERA Forum, in press.
38 See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/projects/stories/jits_en.htm.
39 So Sarah Ludford MEP at Defence Rights Debate at the European Parliament, 12th October 2012.
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989stand up in its current mode and admit that it was its predecessor who struck a nail in
990the coffin of the Framework Decision on Individual Rights in Criminal Proceedings
991as revived by the German Presidency in 2006/7 amongst other things by demanding
992that the presumption of innocence be explicitly excluded for terrorist suspects?
993One may reasonable fear the answer to such questions is no. There is political capital
994to be struck from portraying the EU as an enemy of freedom.40 In counter-terrorism
995terms it cannot be fairly described as having been that. Neither can it, however, be
996described as the beacon of freedom for its citizens. The EU bears value and valuable
997potential as a counter-terrorism actor. It is, however, currently one extremely vulnerable
998to criticism. As an institution which draws its legitimacy from the value it adds to the
999peaceful and democratic lives of its citizens, it is likely fundamentally to be welcomed as
1000a counter-terrorism actor, only however, if this work is embedded in a broader, “freedom
1001maximising”41 context. As such the EU can perhaps currently be described as on the
1002right path but nevertheless as having lost its way.
1003
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